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HARNESSING THE INTERIOR VOTE: 
THE IMPACT OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE, UNBALANCED DEVELOPMENT 
AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
ON THE LOCAL POLITICS OF NORTHEAST BRAZIL1 
Since 1940 three great socio-economic transformations have progressively 
modified the way in which local politics in Northeast Brazil are conduct-
ed. Increasing market penetration and competition with manufactured 
and agricultural products from the industrial heartland have provoked an 
employment crisis in the Northeastern interior. In addition, since the 
1960s a number of national economic policies, which are heavily biased 
in favour of the urban-industrial and export farming sectors of the de-
veloped southern half of Brazil, have depressed farming in peripheral 
regions such as the Northeast. Finally, the conservative-military alliance 
which came into power with the 1964 coup established a highly authori-
tarian regime and consolidated a trend towards centralized government. 
These developments have all increased the dependency of interior poli-
ticians on federal and state government.2 
The interplay of these forces of change gave rise to a modern version 
of the harnessed voter system, which assumes distinctive features in the 
Northeast. For nearly twenty years this system, in turn, proved to be 
fundamental for buttressing the appearance of electoral legitimacy for 
a succession of military governments. Until the last general election in 
1982, Northeastern politicians faithfully turned out the vote for the 
national conservative coalition and in return they were able to share 
power at the federal level and to gain access to government largesse. 
The nature of this national conservative alliance is the key to answer-
ing two basic enigmas concerning the relationship of the Northeast to the 
Southeast and of the urban areas to rural areas within the Northeast. As 
part of this alliance a number of Northeastern politicians have been able 
to occupy relatively high positions in national government even though 
the region's importance, both in economic and in demographic terms, has 
been on the decline for a century or more.3 Moreover, the existence of 
a formidable conservative patronage machine also explains why interior-
based politicians, who represent the traditional agrarian elite, have con-
tinued to dominate state politics in the Northeast despite increasing 
urbanization and the growth of light industry and services in the region. 
It might seem, therefore, that the Northeast is controlled by rural 
interest groups whose leaders, in turn, have a strong voice in national 
affairs. It will be argued here that the exact opposite is the case. Local 
politics of the Northeast have, indeed, assumed national significance and 
one needs to know how they operate in order to understand the post-1964 
political scene in Brazil, but this does not mean that rural interest groups 
exercise much leverage over state and federal politicians. In the increas-
ingly hierarchical and centralized national political system which has 
emerged during this century, voters and leaders of the interior have been 
brought under the firm control of regional political bosses who have, in 
turn, been manipulated by the Southeastern political leaders in control of 
the national government. 
Today the flow of political power is strictly from the top downwards. 
Political decision-making follows a chain of command from the federal 
to state to local levels of government. Strict control of voters and local 
leaders in the Northeast has been made possible because civil service jobs 
and transfer payments have assumed a major role in the economy of the 
interior. High rates of unemployment and poor job opportunities outside 
the government sector are exactly what make Northeastern politics so 
distinctively authoritarian. The modern harnessed voter system is, thus, 
based on the distribution of highly desirable public jobs and these are 
awarded on the basis of political allegiance. 
Within this context, politics in the Northeastern interior have not 
remained static over time but have, in fact, undergone a good deal of 
modification in response to political and economic transformations. 
A gradual shift in the power base of local leaders has occurred and the 
struggle over the political spoils has intensified in the context of a depres-
sed agrarian economy. An important consequence of the changes has 
been the rise of merchants to political predominance in the larger cities 
of the interior. However, this development does not in any significant 
way represent the formation of a local bourgeoisie in opposition to the 
traditional agrarian elite. This did not happen because most important 
merchants either are descendants of the original elite or have been incor-
porated into it by various forms of social alliance. Hence, some of the 
actors may have been substituted and political struggle over scarce re-
sources may have intensified but much of the basic structure of local 
politics has remained intact. 
Geographical and Political Divisions of Northeast Brazil 
What the changes have permitted is greater control and manipulation 
of local government by higher level politicians. This, in turn, buttresses 
a powerful electoral machine that for twenty years gave conservative 
forces at the state and national levels a virtual monopoly of political 
power which only now shows signs of crumbling. Ironically, while the 
transformation of the local economy has allowed for somewhat less 
patron-client dependency of the traditional rural type in local politics, the 
relationship between municipio leaders and state and federal politicians 
has become one of greater dependency. Finally, the increasingly hier-
archical and centralized nature of Brazilian politics makes the whole 
system in itself a serious barrier to the development so desired by North-
eastern politicians. The very nature of the system limits input from the 
lower levels of government so that development policy suffers from all 
the shortcomings of a top-down planning model which is highly biased in 
favour of the urban-industrial sector.4 
First, the economic changes are treated to demonstrate how the des-
perate job situation is at the base of the modern political system in 
the Northeast. Then, the nature of local politics is described to show how 
social relations in the small towns and cities of the interior permit the 
'harnessing' of voters. The third section deals with the shift in the base 
of local power which has taken place in response to economic change. 
Local leadership succession is then treated, in order to show how political 
power remains in the hands of the descendants of the original elite de-
spite the shift in power. Finally, the last two sections deal with the work-
ings of the patronage system and how it relates to the articulation of local 
politics to state and national politics. 
The Northeast 
The Northeast is a region of great ecological, economic and social diver-
sity ranging from the populous cities and domesticated countryside of the 
rainy eastern seaboard to the open spaces of the semi-arid zone and, 
finally, to the frontier areas of the western part of the region. There are 
basically four large geographic zones of the Northeast: the Zona da Mata 
and Litoral, the Agreste, the Sertao and the Meio-Norte and Gerais (see 
map page 3). 
The Zona da Mata and Litoral are humid coastal lowland areas of 
plantations where monocultures of sugarcane, cocoa, cashew nuts and 
other cash crops are grown. The zone is densely populated and the largest 
cities and most state capitals are found there (Table 1). Recife, Salvador 
and Fortaleza are the largest of these industrial, administrative centres 
which dominate the life of the Northeast economically and socially. 
The Agreste is basically a highland semi-humid transitional zone 
between the coast and the semi-arid interior. It is also densely populated 
and a number of fairly large cities in the range of a few hundred thousand 
inhabitants are located there. The rural zone of the Agreste has seen a 
large-scale rural exodus in the wake of decreasing farm size, labour con-
flicts, the penetration of urban interests and the expansion of specialized 
commercial farming. 
The Sertao is a sparsely populated inland zone where recurrent drought 
has long caused serious problems for human occupation. Only a few 
medium-sized cities exist there and the economy is predominantly agra-
rian. Over time rural activities have shifted from extensive cattle ranch-
ing to mixed farming, in which stock-raising still plays a major role. 
The Meio-Norte and the Gerais of Bahia are transitional zones from 
the Northeast to, respectively, the Amazon region and the Central Pla-
teau. Both are mainly frontier areas where population density has been 
traditionally low. However, in recent decades the two zones have been 
experiencing the strain of rapid colonization and violent conflict over land 
ownership. 
The Context of Economic Change 
Since the 1930s, with the construction and gradual improvement of roads 
and railroads into the interior of the Northeast, an intensifying process of 
market penetration has been at work, whereby manufactured goods have 
increasingly taken the place of those made by local craftsmen. Roads 
within the region and between the Northeast and the rest of the country 
were improved during the 1940s and 1950s and a number of key highways 
were asphalted in the 1960s and 1970s. This, together with the rapid ex-
pansion of industries in the Southeast of the country after 1945 as well as 
the more recent growth of manufacturing in the Northeastern capitals, 
has brought about wholescale changes in the consumer patterns of the 
inhabitants in the agrarian interior. 
At the same time the farm sector has been experiencing gradually 
worsening difficulties of both an internal and an external nature. Govern-
ment price control of basic staples and an unfavourable world market for 
natural fibres during the 1960s and 1970s provoked a long period of poor 
farm prices for many important Northeastern crops. This occurred in 
the case of such key staples as beans, maize, manioc and rice as well 
as the main cash crops cotton and sisal, and particularly depressed the 
farm sector of the Sertao and the Agreste. In recent years, faced with 
national shortfalls in the production of staples, farm prices have been 
allowed to rise more than was normal. However, this policy has collided 
with offical efforts to combat Brazil's astronomical rates of inflation 
and IMF demands for the end of government subsidies. So the pattern is 
again swinging back to low produce prices; farmers are refusing to plant 
unprofitable crops on a commercial scale and there is a consequent 
importation of foodstuffs. 
Moreover, because of the laws of equal inheritance, farm size has been 
diminishing rapidly. In the Sertao, from 1950 to 1975 minifundia farms 
with less than 50 hectares increased from 76% to 87% of the total of 
farms. A farm of this size possesses only about one or two hectares of 
good bottomlands, the rest being dry bush lands utilized for livestock 
grazing, and as such barely supports a family. Medium and large farms 
with more than 500 hectares now occupy 35% of the total area in farms as 
compared with 52% in 1950.6 These farms have traditionally employed 
most landless peasants and their decreasing size means that there is less 
land available for them. 
This process has been at work just as intensely in the Agreste where 
environmental conditions are better for farming. However, other factors 
have intervened which prevent the breakup of large farms and so only 
small and medium farmers have been affected by the process. In 1975 
minifundia farms of less than 10 hectares made up 76% of the number of 
farms and occupied 21% of the land in farms as compared with 64% and 
11% respectively in 1950. During the same period, the number of large 
properties of more than 100 hectares and the area occupied by them have 
only fallen from 5% to 3.5% and from 63% to 59% of the total.7 The 
purchase of rural land by urban interest groups, the expansion of com-
mercial farming and the emigration of upper-class individuals to highly 
paid jobs in the state capitals have allowed large farms to remain in-
tact. Hence disparity in land ownership has actually become worse in 
the Agreste, much as has happened in the Zona da Mata, and for many 
of the same reasons. 
In addition to the problem of diminishing farm size, many medium and 
large farmers of the Sertao and the Agreste were alarmed by the Peasant 
Leagues of the early 1960s as well as by their own misinterpretation of 
new rural labour legislation. As a result they encouraged resident oc-
casional labourers and tenants to leave their farms or expelled them out-
right, thus worsening the rural exodus.8 
Confronted by such problems, people of the rural zone have been 
looking increasingly to the towns and cities of the interior for work. 
Better job opportunity is found in towns but it is not sufficient to employ 
the flood of people arriving there. While new jobs were created in light 
industry, commerce and services in the interior towns and cities between 
1950 and 1980, these were not enough to counterbalance increased unem-
ployment and underemployment that were caused by the whole process 
of economic transformation. 
In the Sertao, between 1950 and 1980 the number of workers in in-
dustry increased by 379%, in commerce and transport by 204% and in 
services by 271% but the number of unemployed also increased by 184% 
and, more important, their proportion of the total work force increased 
from 16% to 24% during this period. The annual population growth rate 
of 1.8% in the Sertao versus 2.9% for the country as a whole reflects 
heavy out-migration due to the poor employment situation.9 This prob-
lem is felt by rich and poor alike. Of the children of poor families inter-
viewed, 22% live outside the zone as do 24% of middle- and upper-class 
children. Some of the wealthier go to upwardly mobile jobs in the state 
capital but most individuals of all groups go to the industrial Southeast 
to work as unskilled labourers. No doubt the nearly continuous drought 
since 1975 contributes to the job crisis but drought only worsens the un-
derlying economic problems. 
Indeed, the figures for most of the semi-humid Agreste are even worse 
and near-zero population growth for the last 20 years is found in a num-
ber of places. In the northern half of the zone, where more landless 
peasants were expelled from farms, the number of rural workers actually 
fell by 5% between 1950 and 1980. By 1980 the unemployed portion of 
the work force rose to almost 26% of the total as compared with 15.5% 
of the total in 1950. The employment figures for the whole zone are also 
not encouraging, with over 24% of the work force unemployed in 1980 
while 16.5% had been unemployed in 1950.10 
Given this rather depressed economic situation, one can understand 
why civil service jobs have become so contested. They represent one of 
the fastest growing sectors and, by 1980, services had expanded to the 
point where they employed 11% of the Sertanejo work force as compared 
with only 5% in 1950. Similarly, in the Agreste 13% of the work force 
are now service workers as compared with 5% in 1950.12 Of more im-
portance is the fact that public positions afford a regular and relatively 
high salary which farming, commerce and small industry cannot always 
guarantee. Even low-paying, non-continuous manual labour jobs in pub-
lic works are desirable for lower-class individuals who have few other 
work options. We can see how the awarding of public jobs and funds has 
become a powerful instrument which political leaders at all levels use for 
assuring factional and party loyalties. 
Local Politics and Divided Communities 
The nature of local politics in agrarian societies is different from that 
found in large-scale urban industrial societies. Not only are local politics 
more personal and important for organizing society but they also serve to 
entertain and to define prestige in small communities. The people of the 
Northeast may be deadly serious about the spoils of politics but more is 
involved than just jobs and graft. 
As in the interior of most of Brazil, politics in the small towns and 
cities of the Northeast have long been the great pursuit in life. Tradition-
ally, almost every single act that an individual or a community under-
took would — and to a large extent still does — ultimately have political 
overtones. Politicians take advantage of any collective gathering, such 
as patron saints' days, religious pilgrimages, high school graduation cer-
emonies and the inauguration of public works, to remind the voters just 
who is in charge and what a good job he is doing in office. In addition to 
this, the community itself is usually divided on such occasions, with the 
opinion of the audience and the participants concerning the significance 
of the events being split along factional lines. 
Politics are taken so seriously precisely because they enter almost every 
aspect of community life. Steady jobs with regular and comparatively 
high salaries are at a premium. Basic municipal services can be provided 
or denied, according to factional allegiance. Prominent roles in religious 
ceremonies go to local leaders and Mass always accompanies important 
socio-political events. Even whether a person is prosecuted or not for 
a revenge killing depends on whether he voted for the present mayor. 
For local notables — and for those aspiring to be notables — ultimate 
prestige and abundant spoils are to be won in elections. The control of 
political power has long been just as important for conferring status on 
individuals of the community as has the holding of the right material 
possessions. The two are mutually reinforcing. Small wonder that elec-
tions are so keenly contested in some places that outright gun battles, 
ambushes with intent to kill and long-lasting feuds can result. Nor are 
politics an exclusively male preserve; women, too, are not immune from 
what some informants describe as a 'cancer' in community relations. 
In the small towns and cities of the interior, political activity is one 
of the principal forms of entertainment which television alone has come 
to rival in recent times. Also, it is a good question whether elections or 
revenge killings are the most common topic discussed by the groups of 
people who gather on sidewalks and in bars. Interest in politics as mani-
fested in conversation may, at times, subside between elections but the 
way in which political power interferes with almost everything that hap-
pens is a permanent feature of life. 
Political organization takes over where kinship ties wane in defining 
social groupings. Kindreds gain solidarity and identity through affiliation 
with a particular faction. Factions, in turn, group various kindreds 
together. Also, factions normally cross class and racial divisions. They are 
organized along consanguinal and affinal lines among the upper- and 
middle-class members and extend to their retainers and employees. 
Notwithstanding this, politics can be as disruptive to community 
relations as they are in promoting great social cohesion among faction 
members. Disputing faction leadership can even split kindreds long allied 
by intermarriage. Also, the lion's share of the spoils and prestige remains 
in the hands of the dominant class, no matter which faction is in power. 
This does not go unnoted by the poor, and so politics deepen social 
disparity and class division. The diverting of public funds to private hands 
can reach such extremes that, in some cases, graft can prove to be one of 
the greatest barriers to providing the conditions necessary for develop-
ment. In addition, rather than being upholders of law and order, leaders 
interfere regularly with the judiciary and their penchant for earning votes 
by obtaining the release of supporters from the police and the courts 
actually aggravates feuding. Finally, even such solidarity-promoting in-
stitutions as the Church can be disrupted by factional rivalry, so that a 
priest must be careful that certain acts are not construed as favouring one 
side more than another. 
The ideal model of traditional municipio politics in Brazil is that of two 
competing factions.13 Two competing factions are normally what are 
found at the local level of government in the Northeast but the two need 
not be on an equal footing in terms of electoral power. One-party towns 
exist but they remain as such for only short periods and a second faction 
inevitably arises. Long-term dominance by one faction, with a second one 
remaining in permanent and ineffectual opposition, is another matter and 
this is what is normally found in most municipiot An equal pitting of two 
powerful groups against each other with neither holding on to power for a 
long period is the next most common situation and this is when politics 
can have the most disruptive influence on community relations. 
Political Hierarchy 
From at least the establishment of the Empire, trading favours for votes 
has been the basis of political interaction in rural Brazil, much as it is in 
most elective politics everywhere. However, in the Northeast the use of 
the stick for punishing adversaries is more common than the carrot to 
reward supporters with favours. As the local people describe it, voters are 
'harnessed' (botado no cabresto) and cast their ballots as they are told to, 
or else. This appropriate expression for an agrarian society is an old one 
and has long been used to describe the traditional Brazilian system of 
political control.14 
In the 1978 elections the newly appointed governor of Ceara said that 
if the political leaders of the interior did not arrange the votes as they 
should for his party's candidate for senator, then they would 'go hungry' 
when he took over as governor. Similarly, the governor of Bahia's first 
act upon taking office in 1979 was to dismiss 15,000 state employees, 
including those of his own faction, in order to rehire only those who 
were really his supporters and to put the fear of God into these as 
well. 
The faction in power at the local level, in turn, through its direct con-
trol of municipal services and indirect manipulation of state and federal 
services makes its allies and supporters toe the line. Alternatively, the 
same means are used to punish its rivals as well as to coax and coerce the 
latter's supporters into changing sides. Bastions of opposition power in 
the rural zone receive little in the way of municipal services. The roads 
serving such areas are the last to be resurfaced, if they are repaired at 
all. Their farms will be the last to receive truck-loads of water during 
droughts. And, even more important, they and their children will not 
receive civil service positions. 
Under this system a pyramid of subordinate/superior relationship is 
built upon the boss/worker dyad at the base of the system. This personal 
relationship between unequals is linked to others which rise through the 
different levels to the state capital and even to Brasilia, thus bridging 
local, state and federal levels of government (Figure 1). The person high-
er up in the chain may at times only be giving those below a job or a 
social service which should have been theirs in the first place but the 
perception is that of a patron making possible the delivery of that which 
would have been beyond the reach of the individual acting on his own. 
A farm worker or a poor urban employee is grateful for the use of a 
piece of land or a job, for these are in short supply. Implicitly, part of the 
contract includes the worker's vote for the boss's candidate and after an 
election the patron looks him in the eye and asks if he has voted correct-
ly. Honesty for most rural and small-town Northeasterners is a point of 
honour and a retainer either does not lie or has such difficulty in lying 
that his deceit is obvious to the patron. Mutual understanding is so strong 
that if his boss asks him how he is going to vote in a forthcoming election 
and the retainer wants to vote for another candidate he will say so and, at 
the same time, state that he will be leaving the property or quitting his 
job. If there is some doubt whether a retainer is being 'treacherous', i.e., 
not being truthful about how he votes, and if he is also only semi-literate, 
he is given the voting code of an unknown candidate who would never 
receive a vote in that municipio. If the stray vote does not turn up, the 
retainer's deceit is proven. Such practices are widespread in the North-
east, and Vilaga and Albuquerque describe similar examples throughout 
the interior of the Northeast during the period of the New Republic.15 
Farmers and town employers, in turn, are linked to the village or muni-
cipio leader by ties of kinship and friendship which are reinforced by past 
favours. A son or a daughter might have been given a job in the civil 
service. An ill member of the family would have been taken to a local or 
state capital hospital for free treatment, even if he did not qualify for 
government health insurance. If this were the case, a strategically placed 
member of his faction sees to it that an exception is made or the doctor 
himself is a faction member or a friend of a member. In return for such 
favours most farmers and townspeople do not question for whom they 
will vote. The candidate is picked by the political leaders and is simply 
their faction's candidate. 
At the head of each local faction is the chefe politico (political chief) or 
mandao (boss). The municipio faction leader plays a crucial pivotal role 
in Brazilian electoral politics. He has personal contact with local voters 
and with mid-range state and federal politicians. On election day the 
leader mobilizes the vote for those candidates who, in his opinion, can 
best provide the spoils from higher levels of government. Local jobs, 
services and public funds are ultimately distributed by him. Given this 
power of decision, individuals seeking favours are continually streaming 
in and out of his house and place of business. This is especially true on 
market day when country people come to town and nearly eat him out of 
house and home. 
The actual name given to a faction comes from the leader's immediate 
family name rather than a more global clan name. The dominant faction 
in the study community Belem do Sao Francisco (Pernambuco) is called 
the Lustosas and not a more inclusive name such as the Pires de Car-
valho. Similarly, in Parnamirim (Pernambuco), descendants of the 
original settlers, the Agras, are members of the Cabral faction. The name 
of the traditional family faction of Chorrocho (Bahia), the Pachecos, 
does, in fact, refer to a more inclusive kin group but a large number of 
other elite families, whose ancestors were also original settlers, are 
included in the faction though they are not direct descendants of the 
Pacheco core. Demonstrating this further is the name of their rivals, the 
Carvalhos or the morenos ('coloureds'). Carvalho was the name of one of 
the original leaders of the faction but the leaders who came after him 
were not direct relatives of his and even the faction members who live in 
town do not form a kindred of closely related individuals. The alternative 
name of their group, the morenos, refers to the ethnic group of the 
prominent members of the faction who live in or near the sede de muni-
cipio but many important village allies are, in fact, galegos ('lily whites'). 
The above is the traditional ideal model of political organization in the 
rural Northeast. However, at this level of politics the degree of depen-
dency of individuals at the base of the hierarchy and the nature of their 
participation have varied over time as well as from place to place. This, 
in turn, depends on the nature of the socio-economic transformation 
that has occurred locally and, as Chandler and Forman and Riegelhaupt 
maintain, on the shifting circumstances at the higher levels of 
government.16 
When the county seat is not a medium-sized city or larger, the new 
town jobs that have been created in recent decades have been incor-
porated into the traditional structure of political control. On the other 
hand, the economy, class relations, and the impersonal lifestyle of larger 
cities make for less direct dependency on the part of the poor there. 
Similarly, in areas where the process of landless peasants leaving the 
countryside is more advanced, as in the coastal zones and the more arid 
parts of the Sertao, the tight bonds of agrarian dependency are on the 
wane. In these places the remaining smallholders and urban-oriented 
medium and large landowners still need political connections in order 
to fulfil a number of their needs but they are substantially less depen-
dent than were rural retainers of former times. However, this does not 
mean that the voters of the country and of the small towns and cities 
of the interior are perfectly free to vote as they choose; rather they 
are somewhat less dependent than they were previously. Constraining 
ecological and socio-economic circumstances still work to keep them 
'harnessed'. 
On the other hand, economic dependency is not the sole motivating 
force in local politics. There is the entertainment side to consider. Per-
sons of all classes enthusiastically participate in local elections because for 
them politics are a great spectator sport. To use an appropriate Brazilian 
analogy, a football fan may not select the players or the coach but that 
does not stop him from being a fanatical supporter of his team. 
The Shifting Power Base of Local Leaders 
In the past, political leaders of most Northeastern communities were 
usually large ranchers or planters as well as small general store owners 
or rural produce buyers. Both farming and commerce were important 
sources of economic power and leverage necessary for building up a poli-
tical following. Today, the size of the community and the degree to which 
the local economy is monetarized determine which source of income is of 
greater importance to the power of a leader. The larger the community 
and the greater the local consumption of purchased manufactured items, 
the more political power is based on urban commerce. Also, in communi-
ties of all sizes, leaders and their allies receive the best civil service jobs, 
which further enhances their power. 
Gross has challenged a similar model of interior politics, which was first 
proposed by Leal for the South of Brazil, by Vilaga and Albuquerque 
for the Northeast and more recently by Forman and Riegelhaupt for the 
country as a whole.17 Gross holds that municlpio politics are not merely a 
question of traditional large farmers being confronted by modern mer-
chants. Gross is correct in pointing out that examples exist of faction 
leaders exploiting both commerce and agriculture but one must look 
closer at the kind of community involved and at what is the most 
important economic activity of the local leader. The larger the town, the 
greater is the specialization and scale of commerce, and this makes 
merchants the most powerful individuals in larger urban areas. Leal, and 
Vila^a and Albuquerque portray the situation in terms of a confrontation 
between backwardness and development or traditional and capitalist 
interests. Ignoring the qualifiers, we shall see here that the basic idea of 
these authors is correct; but so is Gross, because the leaders are usually 
descendants of the same traditionally dominant kindred and do not have 
to represent opposing interest groups. 
Large ranchers and farmers are still the most prominent individuals in 
small sedes of up to 2,000 people. Many Northeastern cidades are of this 
size, about a third of the total number, and nearly 10% of the regional 
population live in these municipios (Table 2).18 Chorrocho and neigh-
bouring towns of the north of Bahia State are examples of this type of 
sede de municipio. The power base of the respective leaders of each 
opposing faction is nearly the same: ranching and modest commerce 
(Table 3). 
The economies of communities of 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants are inter-
mediary cases between the smallest cidades, which are firmly based on 
rural activities, and the larger commercial towns and cities. In this type 
of sede, local merchants become prominent and will lead a faction but 
usually they do not have the power to win the mayor's office regularly. 
Most cidades of the Northeast fall into this size group and approximately 
a fifth of the regional population resides in these municipios, 
In such places, the numerous descendants of the first settlers, whose 
power comes from rural supporters, are pitted against some of the town's 
merchants who settled there more recently. To be sure, there are rural 
members in the opposition faction but they too are usually more recent 
settlers who feel excluded. On the other hand, a number of important 
merchants belong to the traditional elite faction so that about all one can 
say is that one group may have more merchants than the other but not in 
a clear-cut way. 
In the study community of Parnamirim, for example, the weaker 
faction is led by the Menezes, outsiders who arrived in the town only in 
the last 40 years and have established themselves as merchants (Table 4). 
Allied to the Menezes are the Clementinos and Mirandas. These two 
families mostly marry among themselves and own farms located on sec-
ondary tributaries of the Riacho da Brigida. Some Mirandas have mar-
ried into the Agra family but their kindred, as a whole, have not become 
close relatives of the Agras. 
The dominant Agra-Cabral faction is made up of the numerous de-
scendants of the first settlers, who also married mostly among themselves. 
Their farms are situated along the main stream of the Riacho da Brigida 
which has greater potential economically and in terms of population 
density. As commerce has not assumed a dominant role in the local econ-
omy, even today the Cabral political leaders can still dominate local poli-
tics through their rural power and monopoly of the civil service. 
After 1945, in larger towns, such as Belem do Sao Francisco, com-
merce became increasingly important as the key to political power. 
Merchants there, like other persons who are not basically farmers by 
profession, dabble in cash crop irrigation but this is not their principal 
source of income. Although the basis for political power has shifted with 
time, power has remained firmly in the hands of the descendants of the 
original settlers (Table 5). Before 1945 the power of this kin group, as 
well as that of the opposition group, was based on rural activities. The 
coroneis who were the leaders before this date were large ranchers and 
the last also had a small general store. 
From 1945 onwards, commerce began to expand and the leaders of the 
dominant faction were merchants first and farmers second. As farming 
gradually became more orientated towards producing for the market, the 
economic power of a rural produce buyer became greater. Similarly, the 
consumer goods shop of the present leader grew larger as the develop-
ment of irrigation generated even greater income for local farmers. This 
income was increasingly spent on new items of consumption that passed 
through the hands of merchants. The opposition faction of their cousin, 
who was only a large rancher, never seriously threatened the power of 
the last two political leaders of the dominant faction. In the 1960s the 
opposition faction ceased to exist and, today, its members adhere un-
easily to the dominant side. 
Fast-growing cities with 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants like Salgueiro 
(Pernambuco), Petrolina (Pernambuco) and Juazeiro (Bahia), show these 
trends even more. These may only represent about 6% of the total num-
ber of cidades in the region but a fifth of the urban population and 17% 
of all Northeasterners reside in the municipios. More importantly, these 
cities are at the hub of commerce, and administrative and social services; 
the middle range of state and federal politicians have their electoral base 
in these local centres. 
Leaders of such cities build a power base which combines various types 
of commerce with light industry. These leaders may be buyers of farm 
products but they are urban in focus. They buy rural produce in order 
to guarantee raw material for their processing factories. Also, they are 
involved in urban consumer commerce and so have an impressive finan-
cial base. At times, they may appear and act like old-time coroneis but 
their political base is different and they are in a better position to dis-
pense private and public favours. With this wide range of transactions 
they have dealings with all sections of the urban and rural population, 
which compensates for any loss of direct political control of the tra-
ditional personal type that might have occurred with the growth of cities. 
Nevertheless, when cities reach this size and larger, the relationship 
between voter and politician is more impersonal. Votes are 'bought' 
rather than 'harnessed', in Vilaga and Albuquerque's distinction.19 
Clothing is given, help in making a move, in addition to the usual aid in 
circumventing the bureaucracy in order to obtain social services. 
Moreover, the multi-role relationship of patron to client begins to 
break down in the cities. Many of the modes of control cited by Lindqvist 
as being common throughout agrarian South America were traditionally 
utilized by employers of the rural Northeast.20 Farmers can closely regu-
late the lives — and votes — of their retainers because landowners often 
combine the role of employer, landlord, produce buyer, shopkeeper, 
creditor, provider of social services and law enforcer. Some of these 
practices have fallen into disuse in the Northeast, even in small farming 
communities, but enough remain in use for effective political control to 
be exercised throughout the interior. 
Lindqvist shows how in the cities these different roles come to rest with 
a number of individuals instead of one powerful patron so that control of 
would-be clients becomes diluted. It is important to point out that this 
occurs only in fairly large cities of the Northeast and not in towns or even 
in small cities there. In the latter, an urban employer retains many of 
the traditional controls because the size of businesses in such places is 
relatively small and the relationship between owner and worker remains a 
personal one. 
An interesting change that accompanies the development of larger 
commercial establishments in the cities is the discontinuance of short-
term consumer credit of the traditional type. This is substituted by 
purchases made on a 'cash-only' basis. Most of the rapidly expanding 
'supermarkets' deal on such a cash-and-carry basis, though they have 
not entirely eliminated small stores selling on credit. Nevertheless, the 
traditional exchange of credit for votes and close personal ties between 
buyer and seller are on the wane for the greater majority of the residents 
of cities. 
In urban areas of more than 100,000 inhabitants, like the state capitals 
and a few cities in the Agreste, sheer size makes life even more imper-
sonal, and, as Norris notes for Salvador, patron-client relationships take 
the form of an array of diffuse single-strand dealings which are dispersed 
among numerous individuals.21 In fact, many of the ties become so weak 
that the concept of patronage is probably not appropriate for qualifying 
the relationship. The word patrao merely refers to the boss in charge of 
the work place. 
Furthermore, the economic independence of the public sector is greater 
in big cities. Quite simply, if the people there do not want to vote for the 
government party they do not have to. The people of the interior are con-
scious of the greater freedom that big-city electors have and they envy it. 
Some personal ties of voters to local councilmen do, in fact, exist in 
large urban areas, in terms of repaying favours, but if the urban poor do 
not wish to enter into such a relationship they will not be barred from 
finding work because of it. While some members of the lower classes can 
improve their chances of locating work or moving up to better jobs if they 
enter into this type of relationship, as Norris observed in Salvador, this 
involves a minority of big-city dwellers. Not enough public jobs are avail-
able to provide for the mass of unemployed and underemployed urban 
poor. 
Usually, when the politics of the Northeast are analysed, too much 
attention is given to the growth of the large cities of the region. The size 
of the urban area is, indeed, important for determining the type of de-
pendency involved in local politics, which is the thesis argued here, but 
one must consider the whole population of a municipio when examining 
the electoral clout of the interior versus the large cities. Looking at it 
in this way, one sees why the votes of the interior are crucial for deter-
mining state leadership. Cidades of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants are 
those most strictly controlled by the traditional system and almost one 
half of the Northeastern population resides in such municipios. Even 
cities of up to 50,000 inhabitants are usually firmly in the hands of 
conservative forces so that almost three-quarters of the regional 
population can be swayed to their political line. 
Admittedly, more large-city dwellers qualify to vote because of higher 
rates of literacy found there, but it is common on election day for interior 
voters experiencing difficulty with their ballots to receive help in signing 
their names and in choosing their candidates. Nor do all interior electors 
need to be among the living for they can miraculously experience resur-
rection in order to go to the polls. 
Local Leadership Succession 
Besides the possession of personal wealth, the control of the municipal 
budget by politicians of the sede also enters into the power equation 
which determines local leadership. Village leaders must depend exclus-
ively on their own resources, which can be depleted by drought, poor 
farm prices or a bad commercial deal. Moreover, they are dependent on 
the chefe politico for any municipal services. Such a state of affairs does 
not make for continuity of power at the village level. The municipio 
leaders, on the other hand, have access to regular, institutionalized 
sources of patronage, such as civil service positions, municipal funds and 
services. This dates from the First Republic, increased considerably under 
Vargas and ballooned in the last two decades. Therefore, if local leaders, 
once gaining power, carefully administer the patronage at their disposal 
they can maintain leadership within a kin group for long periods of time. 
This is particularly true if they handle leadership succession smoothly and 
incorporate new and potentially more powerful economic groups that 
might otherwise take power away from them. 
In addition to the substantial economic resources needed to gain power 
and government spoils to maintain a politician in office, he must also 
know how to lead. The art of leadership is most easily learned by a close 
member of kin who grows up observing, or, as in the case of a son-in-law, 
has many opportunities to note the details of a politician at work. Also, 
his close association with the leader, as well as his own or his wife's pres-
tigious ancestry, give him a stamp of legitimacy in subsequently claiming 
leadership. 
Very often a close relative of the leader is chosen to be his faction's 
mayoral candidate because he can, as a rule, be counted on not to use the 
position to undermine the leader's authority. In addition, the experience 
serves to groom kin for eventual succession. Many leaders prefer not to 
run for mayor themselves but instead stay in the background treating 
important matters while letting the mayor handle the bureaucratic details 
of local government. In addition, there is a trend for mayors to need 
a higher education in a liberal profession, which is not necessary for 
qualifying as a political leader, but which the younger kin of a leader 
quite often possess.22 Thus, the combination of these various prerequi-
sites for local leaders explains why some individuals become chefes 
politicos and others do not. 
In Chorrocho, the leadership of the Pacheco faction, with the excep-
tion of Capitao Menezes, passed from father to son and appeared ready 
to pass on to the grandson of Francisco Pacheco if he had not lost two 
successive mayoral elections (Figure 2). The leadership could still be his 
or it might pass to his brother-in-law or first cousin, who might be viewed 
as being more capable than he. Even the leadership of the rival Carvalho 
faction passed from father-in-law to son-in-law when Sebastiao Pereira da 
Silva took over from Aureliano da Costa Andrade. 
Parnamirim has been a municipio since the late nineteenth century but 
it did not grow and prosper very rapidly and at one time even ceased to 
be a sede. Thus, while leadership of the dominant faction usually remain-
ed in the hands of descendants of the first settlers, some outsiders were 
important also (Figure 3). Col. Jambo and Major Alexandrino were said 
to have shared power before the 1920s. It appears that Col. Mariano 
Costa Araujo was the leader before them. Major Alexandrino was the 
latter's nephew and son-in-law. The exact genealogy of Col. Jambo was 
not obtained but his brothers were married to second cousins of Alex-
andrino. 
In the late 1920s a strong Agra leader did not emerge and an out-
sider, Emendo Calo, a rich rancher who had established himself north 
of the important village of Terra Nova, took over. He aligned himself 
with the Agras in opposition to Antonio Sa Neves of Terra Nova. The 
most important man in the town of Parnamirim at the time was the first 
Cabral, an officer in the military police who had married into the 
traditional family. This was a time of banditry and revolts so he, like 
Capitao Menezes of Chorrocho, probably owed his importance to the 
conditions of the period. 
At any rate, none of the leaders was very strong and, probably because 
of a falling from favour with the new revolutionary government, Parna-
mirim was demoted to district status from 1932-1939. When the Estado 
Nova era of appointed prefeitos ended in 1947, the leadership fell to 
Glicerio Cabral, son-in-law of the previous leader. An important out-
sider, Ulisses Menezes, felt he should have been chosen leader and left 
the faction, joining the sons of Antonio Sa Neves along with members of 
the Miranda and Clementino kindreds in an opposition faction. Ulisses 
had been an appointed mayor but so had Glicerio. Ulisses married a 
daughter of Major Alexandrino, but as the latter had died long before, 
this was a weak claim to leadership. 
Hence, the Cabrais that followed Glicerio as political chiefs had more 
claim to the leadership since they had closer marriage and descent ties to 
recent leaders. Ulisses and his first cousin Firmino after him represent 
the rising urban interests but these were — and still are — not strong 
enough to overcome the Cabral power. On the other hand, a co-leader 
with Antonio Cabral, Raimundo Angelim, was a rich merchant who had 
married into the inner circle of Cabral power. Thus, while the Cabral 
faction mostly represents farmers and civil servants, there are some mer-
chant elements in it as well. 
Recently, a rift developed between the sons of Antonio Cabral and 
the son of Raimundo Angelim over who should be leader. The sons of 
Antonio Cabral are senior civil servants and large ranchers while the son 
of Raimundo Angelim is a dentist and a medium-sized rancher, which 
puts him at a disadvantage in any power dispute within the faction. When 
Placido Angelim was passed over in the choice for mayoral candidate for 
the 1978 election, the Angelims left the faction. By the 1982 elections 
they had joined the other side and Placido was their unsuccessful candi-
date for mayor. 
Belem do Sao Francisco has been a municipio since the beginning 
of this century and, despite the fact that power gradually shifted from 
ranchers to merchants, the leadership remained in the traditional family 
(Figure 4). Col. Trapia and Col. Jeronimo were partners in power. They 
were second cousins and Col. Jeronimo was married to a niece of Col. 
Trapia. Leadership then passed to Col. Caribe, who was a nephew of 
Col.Trapia. He dominated the scene until his death in the mid-1940s. 
At this point a dispute arose over who should be the next leader. By 
previous experience and closeness of kinship ties, Aciole Roriz felt he 
should have taken over. His son was married to a daughter of Col. Caribe 
and his brother-in-law, Col. Pedro da Luz, was an important man. How-
ever, the economic power of Elisio Lustosa won out even though he was 
only a second cousin of Col. Caribe. On the other hand, he was a nephew 
of Col. Jeronimo and a second nephew of Col. Trapia. In turn, leadership 
went to his nephew Deoclecinho Lustosa, who is an even wealthier mer-
chant. 
While the rift in the 1940s and 1950s was apparently healed, and the 
Rorizes rejoined the faction, tension still exists within the 'Family'. In 
1976 one of their relatives, a wealthy irrigation farmer, tried to mount an 
opposition faction and ran for mayor. While he was able to make the race 
a contest for the first time in years, after the election he was forced back 
into the fold with the threat of not having his farm loans approved. By 
1982 he was the vice-mayoral candidate of the Lustosa-led faction. 
Thus a number of factors come together to explain who leads factions 
and how the lack of one trait can doom a man's aspirations. All leaders 
are usually men who are rich, have claims to a prestigious ancestry and 
close contact with the previous leader. However, if a son or other close 
relative of a leader is to succeed he must be capable, politically inclined 
and of age, for, if he is not, rival kin seize the initiative. At the death of 
Major Alexandrino of Parnamirim, his son was still an adolescent and the 
heirs of the leader Col. Jambo did not seem to be politically inclined, so 
that leadership passed to other families. 
An important facet of leadership transition is the risk that a faction 
can lose important members when a leader dies and where succession is 
not clear. A disgruntled, failed rival for leadership leaves the faction to 
join, or to form, another. The rival may represent an old economic group 
being pushed aside or, conversely, a new force that has not yet come 
into its own. The former was the case of the Roriz opposition faction 
that existed for a while in Belem. Alternatively, the Menezes and, more 
recently, the Angelims of Parnamirim went into opposition because their 
leaders, who exercise important urban professions, felt that they should 
have been chosen as successors. Ambitious village leaders, who are not 
close relatives of county-seat leaders, are even more inclined to switch to 
the side which makes the best offer. This is particularly a problem for 
small cidades like Chorrocho, where shifting coalitions of large villages 
throw elections one way or another. 
A final point to be made concerning leadership succession and socio-
economic change is the effect of the emigration of upper-class children to 
the state capital or other large cities for employment or cultural reasons. 
This has long been a problem in areas of rural-urban emigation, as Quei-
roz demonstrates for the south of Brazil.23 If the ruling elite is not care-
ful, it can lose contact with the local situation and political power. This 
could happen with the children of Antonio Cabral in Parnamirim and did 
occur with Capitao Menezes in Chorrocho and with the children of Pedro 
da Luz in Belem. On the other hand, when they are administrators 
or practitioners of liberal professions in the large cities such individuals 
can be invaluable contacts for obtaining state services for the faction at 
home. At times they are higher-level politicians in the hierarchy and are, 
therefore, indeed quite useful. 
To the Victor Go the Spoils 
There is a common understanding among the members of a community 
that the faction which wins elections has the right to use municipio funds 
as its leaders see fit. In addition, all municipal jobs go to their supporters. 
Similarly, the winners of state and federal elections, i.e., the faction 
whose candidates receive the most votes locally, fill all the new local state 
and federal jobs. They can even demand the replacement of members of 
the defeated group who hold certain civil service positions. 
Such partisan practices are so ingrained in the local politics of the 
Northeast that concepts of political graft and corruption, current in some 
parts of Brazil, have no meaning at all for the local people. A particular 
mayor who steals too much can be condemned or ridiculed as a thief with 
such statements as, 'Milton Cao stole so much that he died'. However, 
normal embezzlement receives, at most, the attention of a smile. Oppo-
sition factions do not complain because they do the same when they are 
in power. 
The amount of funding that the poor municipios of the interior receive 
from the higher levels of government far exceeds the taxes they pay to the 
state and federal government, and transfer payments received from the 
latter have been increasing at a pace faster than the rate of inflation so 
that, by local standards, a huge amount of money is being made avail-
able to prefeitos for 'distribution'. For example, in 1977 the municipal 
budget of Chorrocho had receipts of US $188,547 and Parnamirim of 
US $221,493, meaning that even a normal 20-30% rate of embezzlement 
involves large sums of money. More intelligent politicians invest embez-
zled funds far away from the eyes of the community. Usually they buy 
land and apartments in the state capitals. 
Outright theft of county funds is the most obvious kind of graft. A less 
direct way is to award public works projects to local 'firms' in which the 
mayor or his kin have a secret interest. Reservoirs, buildings and barbed-
wire fences are erected on the mayor's farm as well as on those of his 
important supporters. Similarly, large reservoir projects are located in 
places where the ruling faction has a big following. Also, urban improve-
ments and services begin first in those parts of town where important 
Plate 1. Cemetery entrance with mayor's name prominently displayed 
(Chorrocho, 1978) 
Plate 2. State deputy candidate 'speaking beautifully' at a political rallv 
(Chorroch6, 1978) 
members of the faction reside and they may not even reach the streets 
where opposition members live, let alone the poor parts of town. 
Chorrocho best exemplifies how merely making funds available to poor 
municipios with little supervision does not improve local conditions. 
Despite the large influx of government funding, the community at the 
time of the first period of fieldwork did not have running water, water 
treatment, reliable electricity, a sewage system, refuse collection, paved 
streets, a resident doctor or dentist, medical facilities of any kind or bank-
ing services. 
Politics, however, are not just jobs and graft. Prestige is another im-
portant goal and one of the best ways of self-promotion is to have one's 
name painted in large letters on all public works undertaken while in 
office. The works have to be clearly visible and of a durable kind, such 
as schools, municipal offices, cemeteries and libraries (Plate l).24 It is 
the building itself that is important, for often there is not much inside it in 
the way of furnishings and material; nor does it have to be functional. 
Many are virtual ovens. Also, the number of public structures need not 
be proportional to the needs of the town. Chorrocho, with a population 
of about 800, has five different schools, two cemeteries and a number of 
public buildings. Each building serves as a source of prestige and graft for 
the mayor who built it as well as to employ, at least on paper, numerous 
civil servants. 
When the mayor of an opposing faction comes to power he tries to find 
ways in which to nullify the works of his adversaries. Municipal buildings 
are 'renovated', that is, repainted. In the process the name of the mayor 
who constructed them is, of course, painted out and replaced by 'reno-
vated during the administration of [the present mayor]'. An extreme way 
of assailing an opponent's pride is by razing one of his buildings to the 
ground and erecting a bigger and better one in its place. Sometimes, a 
public building may have been well constructed and much effort and 
expense are expended in pulling it down. Occasionally, the effort can 
backfire, as happened in one case observed where an old market building 
completely resisted demolition and the humiliated mayor had to console 
himself with a mere renovation sign. 
However, much of the spoils must go to maintaining factional loyalty. 
While public works are favoured sources of graft and personal prestige as 
well as excellent ways of rewarding lower-class supporters with work, 
leaders have to expend a good deal of effort and county funds in repay-
ing the support of upper- and middle-class allies. These people form the 
backbone of his political machine. They mobilize their personal following 
of retainers, employees, debtors and compadres to vote for him. Work 
given to the lower class actually involves accountable physical labour 
and the payment of low wages means that large numbers of them can be 
rewarded. Jobs for the upper classes have to be of a longer-lasting kind, 
should not involve much work and must be better paid. 
While the members of the middle and upper classes insist that day-
labourers work a full eight-hour day on their farms, in their public jobs 
they cannot be bothered with more than four hours a day or, in many 
cases, any work at all. With the exception of school teachers who are 
women working long, hard hours for poor pay, most public employment 
positions in the small towns of the interior do not involve much work, 
owing to the fact that many munidpios have a small population which is 
mainly rural and dispersed. Government offices are normally busy only 
on market days while, during the rest of the week, one or two people will 
require their services. Also, a large number of the civil servants do not 
work whatsoever and go to their places of employment only to receive 
pay cheques. 
However, the concession of desirable state and federal jobs is not with-
in the local leader's domain. He can nominate the candidate but to obtain 
an appointment he has to go to the capital numerous times for personal 
meetings with high-level politicians in order to ensure that the proper 
connections are made with the right senior bureaucrats in the different 
government agencies. And it is exactly through such contacts that state 
and federal politicians, in turn, exert complete control over local leaders. 
Often the latter and their close kin are employed in the best civil service 
positions and so are quite sensitive to demands from above. If they are 
not themselves civil servants, many important followers are and, as Dias 
shows for a Zona da Mata community, even large merchants and mill 
owners do not wish to fall foul of tax agents and financial institutions 
which are vital to the survival of their enterprises.25 So even those indi-
viduals who are more economically independent of the public sector and 
who may not be politically inclined by nature are forced to participate in 
politics and to toe the line. 
State and Federal Politics and Policy at the Local Level 
(1945-1984) 
Up to this point in the analysis, the word 'party' has been studiously 
avoided and the term 'faction' has been used to describe the local political 
groupings. Revolutions and national parties come and go, having little 
real impact on the local scene. National parties are merely adapted to 
munidpio and state factionalism and their policies do not mean much at 
the local level. The candidates who can deliver the most are supported 
and at the same time the most powerful candidates seek out the strongest 
local faction. 
During the Second Republic (1945-1964) the most powerful political 
party of the interior of the Northeast, which represented ranching and 
cotton interests, was the PSD (Partido Social Democratico). Its chief rival 
was the UDN (Uniao Democratica Nacional), which was controlled by 
the coastal sugarcane planters and mill owners.26 At the national level 
these parties represented more or less the same class interests. The UDN 
was a conservative party of the urban middle and upper classes while the 
PSD represented rural upper-class interests.27 
Throughout most of the Northeastern interior, the PSD was usually the 
party of the strongest local faction and the UDN was that of the weaker 
opposition group. At times the UDN faction was dominated by dissident 
commercial interests, as in small towns like Parnamirim, but in larger 
towns and cities like Belem do Sao Francisco, the situation could be just 
the opposite with ranchers controlling the UDN and the dominant mer-
chants the PSD, or, again, both parties could be dominated by ranchers, 
as in very small communities such as Chorrocho. Factions could even 
switch party affiliations if these threatened the local way of defining 
factional identity, as occurred in 1958 when the Alencar and Sampaio 
rival factions of Exu switched parties because Cid Sampaio was the can-
didate for governor of the UDN which before his nomination had been 
the party of the Alencars. So there was no hard and fast rule as to which 
type of economic group was associated with which party, other than that 
the PSD faction was usually the party of the strongest local faction. 
The 1964 military takeover resulted in the abolition of the national 
parties that had arisen since 1945 and overwhelming power was bestowed 
on the government party ARENA (Alianga Renovadora Nacional). The 
local factions of most interior communities aligned themselves with 
ARENA because the dominant national party allowed for factionalism 
within itself, almost in the manner of the pre-1930 politico, de adesao. 
This was accomplished by the system of sub-legendas whereby the total of 
votes for the candidates of different factions for local, state and federal 
office are added to give the party's total and the party candidate with the 
highest number of votes wins the election. 
The two local factions simply called themselves ARENA I and 
ARENA II, the strongest of which had the privilege of being I. The 
declining fortunes of a faction can be confirmed symbolically by its being 
demoted from I to II. Similarly, in 1979 when ARENA was replaced by 
the new government party, the PDS (Partido Democrata Social), the 
name of municipio factions was merely changed to the PDS I and the 
PDS II. So even when competition between strong parties at the state 
and federal level was reduced, local and state factionalism continued as 
always. Despite the fact that most candidates are members of the govern-
ment party, certain candidates for local, state and federal office are 
identified with one faction or another. 
After the 1964 coup, the national opposition party, the MDB (Movi-
mento Democratico Brasileiro) had great difficulty in organizing at the 
local level in most of the interior of the Northeast because its leaders 
could not deliver the jobs and spoils from the higher levels of govern-
ment. The party was only successful in organizing a serious challenge to 
the government party in some of the larger cities of the Agreste and Zona 
da Mata, principally in Paraiba and Pernambuco States, that is, in places 
where civil service jobs and political spoils are not vital to the local econ-
omy. Until quite recently, to be associated with the opposition party in 
most interior communities was tantamount to being considered crazy. Not 
only did such a person have the whole government machinery against him 
but he could even place himself in physical danger, as the murders of 
some interior opposition members in Alagoas and Rio Grande do Norte 
States in 1983 and 1984 demonstrate. 
Under the modern version of the harnessed voter system, state and 
federal deputies and senators rarely need to appear in their constituencies 
and usually only do so once a year or perhaps even just before an elec-
tion. An election is one of the rare occasions when a politician needs 
something from the local leaders and general population. Going to a 
person for help is a sign of dependence and subordination in the North-
east, so that many higher-level politicians prefer only a rare and brief 
courtesy visit to the local leader in order to demonstrate the latter's im-
portance before his supporters. 
Some higher-level politicians may go through the motions of making 
political speeches to the general public but they come mainly in order to 
arrange votes with local leaders. When electoral speeches are made, they 
can be important social events. However, the emphasis is on eating and 
drinking for sometimes a candidate may have little of any substance to 
offer the people in pre-election speeches and has to rely on 'speaking 
beautifully', whereby he only offers praise for local leaders, admiration 
for the people's ruggedness and other pleasantries (Plate 2). 
Speeches to the general populace are more commonly made when 
something more concrete is offered, such as the inauguration of local 
banks, roads or reservoirs. Such works affect everyone and intelligent 
politicians undertake them in their first and last years of office for maxi-
mum effect. At official openings, a politician boasts that it was he who 
made it all possible. He might even have the work named after himself 
and the bigger the structure the more prominent his reputation. Or he 
can be honoured by his name being given to a street or highway but a 
truly great politician has his name given to a municipio while still living or 
even while still in office. 
The emphasis on 'bigness' as prominence has resulted in many a white 
elephant whose size cannot be justified by local socio-economic con-
ditions but rather by its being a monument to 'Progress' in the name of 
important politicians. Waste and even social harm can be the result. One 
politician's mother thought that a giant overpass system was needed to 
give the appearance of a big city to what is, in truth, merely a medium-
sized commercial one. The system connects up with a wholly inadequate, 
narrow bridge that sorely needed to be enlarged. Huge reservoirs and 
hydro-electric dams are another favoured type of public works. However, 
they often inundate scarce agricultural land, cause large-scale emigration 
and worsen problems with flooding and salinization. 
The above examples are only a few of the countless number that could 
be cited, all of which stem from the basic problem of higher-level poli-
ticians with inflated egos who no longer live in the region they represent, 
having lost contact with local reality. They live in the state and federal 
capitals and dream of North-American-style development. They are 
advised by technicians with similar backgrounds and aspirations. Some 
worthy projects are undertaken, such as the building of roads, rural 
electrification and the founding of local branches of government banks 
but, all too often, the public works are overpriced, of shoddy workman-
ship and not always attuned to the needs of the local population. 
The political system works from the top down. Decisions concerning 
development strategy are made in Brasilia or in the state capitals in such 
a way that local input into the process is minimal and no feedback occurs. 
Irrigation projects are a case in point. Local interests and experience are 
swept aside. Technocrats, who were trained in wholly different socio-
economic settings, rule supreme. California-style capital-intensive agri-
culture and the rural problems of the Brazilian Southeast are introduced, 
aggravating the traditional difficulties of the Northeastern interior.28 
In such a system, local leaders are usually powerless to protest, and 
would not do so if they could, for fear of losing their livelihood. This 
runs counter to the hypothesis of Forman and Riegelhaupt that greater 
local autonomy has developed. The poor may have gained a little more 
independence but this is only really significant in the large cities and 
dependency has actually increased between lower and higher levels of 
government.29 
The problem of balance of political power is no longer that of rural 
interest groups dominating the higher levels of government, as in former 
times, but rather the opposite, that of the urban-industrial sector dictating 
rural policy. The dilemma for the implementation of development plan-
ning decisions arises not from local political interference causing such 
efforts to go astray but rather from the inappropriateness of the actions 
taken. 
National and regional planners know little about the local circum-
stances of targeted areas and this is further aggravated by the lack of 
feedback from the local level to the top of the decision-making hierarchy. 
All too often high-level officials and agency reports complain of the back-
wardness and ignorance of the local population hindering change when, 
in fact, the authoritarian nature of the political system and the bureau-
cratic structure of the planning agencies pose more serious barriers to 
development. Indeed, many younger agency personnel voice frustration 
with the way that decisions are made and with the poor results of de-
velopment efforts to date. However, they are powerless to protest and 
if they do they may be ignored, never promoted again or even sacked 
outright. This occurs because the political relations of the society at large 
are reproduced within the agencies. 
Given such a system of strict control over local politics, it is small 
wonder that during the military period calls for the restoration of democ-
racy at the higher levels of government and many other of the progessive 
programmes of the national opposition parties did not have much of an 
audience throughout most of the Northeastern interior. Much of state and 
federal government is remote from the concerns of local people and they 
have no influence on decisions made there. In addition, at the municipio 
level and even for some mid-level state and federal offices, which are 
those that have real meaning for the people of the interior, different 
factions exist and they dispute contested elections for these offices, so 
that at these levels elective politics continued to exist. Indeed, when, for 
reasons of national politics, local elections are rescheduled for a later 
date, the people of the interior start to complain because elections are 
great social events in their lives. 
From this it may be concluded that the lack of choice between com-
peting parties at higher levels of government and electors being forced to 
vote for government party candidates for high office are not matters of 
great importance to the people of the interior. On the other hand, the 
small-town politics of the country were of great significance for main-
taining the conservative regime in power, as was clearly evident in the 
1978 and 1982 elections. In these elections, the interior votes outweighed 
the votes of the capitals, and the Northeast with its numerous small states 
helped maintain the appearance of a government majority at the state 
and federal level. 
Nevertheless, times are changing and population shifts have increased 
the electoral clout of the large cities of the coast where electors are freer 
to vote as they choose and are increasingly opting for the PMBD. The 
1982 elections promised to be close and the opposition parties almost 
won the governor races in a number of Northeastern states. Before the 
elections such a possibility made many local leaders of the interior 
nervous for the first time for almost 20 years about being on the wrong 
side. Improved communications had allowed for previously little-known 
opposition candidates to become popular with country people and 
threatened to undermine the whole system in many Northeastern states. 
Some local political leaders hedged their bets. In the 1979 reformulation 
of the national parties, local mayors had to opt for the new government 
party, the PDS, but many local leaders decided not to join any party for 
the time being, waiting to see if they would have to join the victorious 
opposition party after the elections. 
Thus, support for the national government party was really not as 
strong as it seemed in a situation where the politician who delivers the 
spoils receives allegiance. Many local people point out that it was only 
after the 1964 coup that such an idea of a government party arose and 
that it does not go down too well with them. As the programmes of the 
national parties have never had any real meaning for the local population 
so they have no real deeply-felt loyalty to parties that change names every 
ten years. As has often occurred in the past when local expediency de-
mands, factions change higher-level party affiliation. 
In the 1982 elections, in a last desperate attempt to maintain eroding 
national support, the government rammed through the federal Congress 
before the election an electoral change which takes advantage of the 
traditional political system prevalent throughout the less developed north-
ern half of the country. As many national leaders are from the North 
and the Northeast they are perfectly well aware that local loyalties over-
ride any higher-level ones. The new law requires that votes be cast on a 
strictly party basis. The ruling national politicians gambled correctly that 
Northeastern voters would cast their ballots for higher level candidates of 
the government if they wanted to vote for their choice for mayor and 
councilmen. 
The opposition tried to counter this move by promoting the voto ca-
mararao, whereby voters cast their ballot for local candidates and simply 
left it blank for high-level candidates. Significantly, in such a small and 
out-of-the-way place in Bahia State as Chorrocho, 17% of the voters 
left the ballot blank for the Governor and federal Senator candidates 
while only 4% did so for mayor candidates. Similarly, in Parnamirim, 
where opposition candidates had become popular, 31% of the votes for 
Governor and federal Senator were left blank while only 8% were cast 
blank for mayor. This could have been done out of protest or because the 
people simply had no interest in the highest level candidates. 
At any rate, the blank votes were not enough to overcome the mech-
anism for strict control over local politics and the Northeast proved to be 
the salvation of the PDS in the election. The secret of the government's 
success, besides the usual gerrymandering of electoral laws, was the ex-
panded spoils system mounted upon traditional loyalties which, given the 
desperate jobs situation of the region, 'harnessed' country people. 
In the Southeast and South, more private sector employment oppor-
tunity exists and electors are freer to vote as they choose, even for so-
called radicals like Brizola if they wish. In the North and Central-West of 
Brazil, the opposition made serious inroads which infuriated govern-
ment leaders who had made a point of investing heavily there. These two 
regions differ radically from the Northeast. A situation where large-scale 
immigration occurs and good job opportunities exist proves difficult to 
control with the traditional political machine. In these places local poli-
ticians and voters were freer to opt for the national opposition parties 
than was the case of the Northeast. 
Northeastern Politics in the New Republic 
After the 1982 election, popular support for the military government 
rapidly eroded to the point that the opposition came to power. In January 
1985, Tancredo Neves, a moderate PMDB leader, was selected president 
by the Electoral College despite various attempts to gerrymander the 
presidential succession. 
During the campaign it became increasingly apparent that the oppo-
sition would win the presidency and many prominent Northeastern poli-
ticians gradually cut their ties to the PDS. These 'dissidents' established a 
new party, the Partido Frente Liberal (PFL), and they formed a tactical 
alliance with the opposition parties which gave them a majority in the 
Electoral College. This development, together with the choice of Paulo 
Maluf of Sao Paulo State as the official PDS candidate, provoked yet 
more desertions from what was described as the 'imploding' government 
party. As the conservative leadership of the Northeast played an import-
ant role in the opposition victory for president we may ask whether the 
collapse of the military government will make all that much difference to 
the conduct of Northeastern politics? 
The Northeast will probably maintain its relative importance in nation-
al affairs. Even before the death of Tancredo Neves, a number of North-
eastern politicans were awarded ministries and other important govern-
ment posts in return for support rendered during the presidential cam-
paign. The vice-president, Jose Sarney, who assumed the presidency, is 
an important Northeastern politician and he was a member of the 
original PDS dissident group. The PFL has overtaken the PDS in the 
opinion polls and is now the second largest party in Brazil. All of this will 
maintain the political importance of the Northeast, but the region has 
some way to go before it can rise above its status of aa junior partner 
to power. A Northeasterner assumed the presidency by chance and the 
powerful ministries are still in the hands of Southeasterners. 
An opposition president will have even less of an impact on the interior 
politics of the Northeast, particularly in the short run. During the presi-
dential contest, in their haste to assure victory in the Electoral College, 
the national opposition leaders allied themselves with the whole con-
servative leadership of the Northeast. Even some notorious masters of 
the harnessed vote system, like the twice governor of Bahia Antonio 
Carlos Magalhaes, were allowed to join the bandwagon. At a stroke, the 
regional PMDB politicians had their potential power cut from under 
them. Further strengthening the position of the PFL is the fact that the 
PMDB has been slow to organize in the interior of the Northeast and it 
remains essentially a party of the big cities. 
The broad alliance of the presidential succession was only a temporary 
marriage of convenience and there will be no merger of the PFL and 
PMDB in the Northeast. The two groups will most likely continue to 
compete for Northeastern local, state and federal offices in the same way 
as in the past but with the important difference that the conservative 
group will no longer have the official stamp of representing the govern-
ment party. Even before the inauguration, the PFL and PMDB were 
already fighting amongst themselves over the important posts in the new 
administration. Furthermore, some Northeastern politicians have pre-
dicted that the upcoming mayoral elections in the state capitals will 
consummate the divorce. 
Hence, in essence, politics have returned to those of the Second 
Republic when elections were competitive at all levels of office. This 
might permit greater local autonomy if municipal politicians are able to 
play rivals at the state and federal levels off against one another, although 
this will probably not happen as it will be hard to reverse decades of a 
trend towards ever greater centralization. 
Politics of the interior will change only when a real alternative party is 
available for members of the rural lower class, as in the early 1960s. The 
present system is of the vertical type which crosses class lines rather than 
allows for horizontal mobilization. It is doubtful whether the PMDB is 
such a party. Its leaders do not even represent an urban worker political 
movement, much less one that includes the rural poor. The PMDB is 
merely an alternative urban elite, in the same way that municipio oppo-
sition leaders of the interior represent an alternative rural-commercial 
elite at the local level. It remains to be seen whether the re-legalized 
Communist parties (PC do B and PCB) will return to this type of role in 
the Northeast or whether something along the lines of the Partido do 
Trabalhador (PT) is called for. At any rate, these parties have a long way 
to go before they can compete with the PFL or PMDB in the Northeast. 
Such a state of affairs poses a dilemma for regional development. Rad-
ical political change and decentralization are necessary preconditions for 
resolving the agrarian problems of the Northeast and this task will never 
be tackled seriously until the political structure is modified in such a way 
that the general public gains an active role in government. If North-
easterners are not given the chance to choose politicians who can change 
the failed policies that have so far been pursued, they will continue to 
vote overwhelmingly with their feet. 
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Table 1. Population, Area and Demographic Density of the Zones of the 
Northeast in 1980 
Zone 
Zona da Mata 
& Litoral 
Population 
inhabitants 
13,211,848 
% 
37.9 
Area 
km2 
149,318 
% 
9.7 
Density 
(inhab./km2) 
88.5 
Agreste 6,033,982 17.3 133,267 8.6 45.3 
Sertao 9,577,504 27.5 633,928 41.2 15.1 
Meio-Norte & 
Gerais 6,037,307 17.3 623,119 40.5 9.7 
NORTHEAST 34,860,641 100.0 1,539,632 100.0 22.6 
Source of Data: Fundacao IBGE (1981) 
Table 3. Mayors, Factions and Political Leaders of Chorrocho (Bahia) 
Term Mayor Profession3 Faction 
1922-26b — — — 
1927-45b — — — 
1945-52b — — — 
1952-55 Aureliano da Costa Andrade medium rancher Carvalhos 
1955-59 Doroteu Pacheco large rancher Pachecos 
1959-63 
1963-69 
1969-73 
Jose Calazans Bezerra 
Doroteu Pacheco 
Antonio Pires de Menezes 
medium rancher 
large rancher 
large rancher 
Carvalhos 
Pachecos 
Pachecos 
1973-77 Pascoal de Almeida Lima medium farmer both 
1977-83 
1983-
Sebastiao Pereira da Silva 
Jose Juvenal de Araujo 
merchant, 
small rancher 
medium rancher 
Carvalhos 
Carvalhos 
Source: Field Research a Italicized profession is principal one. 
b The period before Chorrocho was a municipio. 
Table 2. Size, Number and Population of Northeastern Municipios 
Size of Sede Municipios Municipio Sede de Municipio 
number % inhabitants3 % inhabitants % 
2,000 and less 430 31.3 3,453,471 9.9 522,956 3.4 
2,001—5,000 478 34.8 7,180,126 20.6 1,545,293 10.1 
5,001—10,000 244 17.7 5,682,226 16.3 1,715,402 11.2 
10,001—20,000 118 8.6 4,394,686 12.6 1,644,954 10.8 
20,001—50,000 67 4.9 3,969,122 11.4 2,034,677 13.3 
50,001—100,000 18 1.3 2,074,180 5.9 1,211,868 7.9 
100,001—500,000 15 1.1 4,086,571 11.7 3,315,279 21.6 
500,001-1,000,000 1 0.1 1,308,919 3.8 648,815 4.2 
greater than 1,000,000 2 0.2 2,711,340 7.8 2,680,491 17.5 
TOTAL 1,373 100.0 34,860,641 100.0 15,319,735 100.0 
Source of Data: Fundagao IBGE (1981) 
aAs occasionally occurs with the Census, the sum of the date for the municipios does not agree with 
the totals nor do the different totals agree with one another. 
Traditional Family 
Faction Leader 
Francisco Pacheco 
de Menezes 
Cap. Jose Campos 
Menezes 
Doroteu Pacheco 
Profession3 
medium rancher 
military police 
large rancher 
Opposition 
Faction Leader 
Enoque Pires 
Adivino Alves de 
Carvalho 
Adivino Alves de 
Carvalho 
Aureliano da 
Costa Andrade 
Profession3 
large rancher 
medium rancher 
notary public 
medium rancher 
Aureliano da 
Costa Andrade 
S«bastiao Pereira 
da Silva 
merchant, 
small rancher 
Doroteu Pacheco Sebastiao Pereira 
da Silva 
Table 4. Mayors, Factions and Political Leaders of Parnamirim 
(Pernambuco) 
Term Mayor Profession3 Faction 
1900-26 
1926-30 
1930-32b 
1932-33b 
1933-39c 
1939-44b 
1944-45b 
1945-46b 
1946-47b 
19472 
1947-52 
1952-55 
1955-59 
1959-63 
1963-69 
1969-73 
1973-77 
1977-83 
1983- Geova Lustosa B. 
Cabral 
large rancher 
and farmer 
large rancher 
large rancher 
and farmer 
large rancher 
pharmacist 
rancher 
pharmacist 
large rancher 
large rancher 
large rancher 
large rancher 
large rancher 
merchant 
large rancher 
state civil 
servant, small 
rancher 
state civil servant 
Agra 
Calo-Agra 
Sa Neves 
Calo-Agra 
Calo-Agra 
Calo-Agra 
Calo-Agra 
Cabral (Agra) 
Menezes 
Cabral (Agra) 
Cabral (Agra) 
Angelim-Cabral 
Angelim-Cabral 
Angelim-Cabral 
Menezes 
Angelim-Cabral 
Cabral 
Cabral 
Source: Field Research 
a Italicized profession is principal one 
b Vargas period when mayors were appointed 
c A period when Parnamirim was demoted to village status 
n.a. 
Docora Calo 
Antonio Sa Neves 
Docora Calo 
Glicerio Parente 
Milton Firmino de 
Menezes 
Ulisses Firmino de 
Menezes 
Napoleao Lustosa 
Araujo 
Ulisses Firmino de 
Menezes 
Gumercindo Lustosa 
Cabral 
Gumercindo Lustosa 
Cabral 
Raimundo Batista 
Angelim 
Washington Gomes da 
Costa 
Raimundo Batista 
Angelim 
Jose Magalhaes Landim 
Maria Alice Cabral 
Ivanildo Amando Agra 
Traditional family 
Faction Leader Profession3 
Opposition Faction 
Leader Profession3 
Major Alexandrino Araujo 
Col. Jambo Aquino Batista 
Ermendo Calo 
Ermendo Calo 
Glicerio Parente 
Glicerio Parente 
Raimundo Batista Angelim 
and Antonio Lustosa Cabral 
Raimundo Batista Angelim 
and Antonio Lustosa Cabral 
Antonio Lustosa Cabral 
Jipson Lustosa Cabral 
large rancher 
large rancher 
large rancher 
and farmer 
large rancher 
large rancher 
civil servant 
large rancher 
Antonio Sa Neves large rancher 
large rancher 
Antonio Sa Neves 
Ulisses Firmino de 
Menezes 
pharmacist 
Ulisses Firmino de 
Menezes 
Firmino Alves de 
Menezes 
Firmino Alves de 
Menezes 
civil servant, 
contractor and 
small rancher 
Jipson Lustosa Cabral Placido Angelim dentist, 
medium rancher 
Table 5. Mayors, Factions and Political Leaders of Belem do Sao Francisco 
(Pernambuco) 
Term Mayor Profession3 
1903-4 Col. Jeronimo P. de large rancher 
Carvalho Trapia 
1904-7 Col. Jeronimo Pires de large rancher 
Carvalho 
1907 Col. Jeronimo P. de large rancher 
Carvalho Trapia 
1907-10 Col. Manoel Araujo de large rancher, 
Carvalho Caribe small merchant 
1910-13 Col. Jeronimo Pires de large rancher 
Carvalho 
1913-16 Antonio Augusto de large rancher 
Souza Sa 
1916 Col. Manoel Araujo de large rancher, 
Carvalho Caribe small merchant 
1916-19 Cap. Olegario Pires n.a. 
Cantarelli 
1919-22 Cap. Francisco Alves large rancher 
de Carvalho 
1922-26 Col. Pedro da Luz large rancher, 
rural product buyer 
1926-36 Acioly Roriz da Luz large rancher 
1936-37 Elisio Lustosa de rural product buyer, 
Carvalho med ium rancher 
1937-39b Geroncio Pires Leonel large rancher 
1939-4lb Dr. Jose Alventino doctor 
Lima 
1941-42b Joao Batista Sena n.a. 
1942b Jader de Alema n.a. 
Cireiros 
1942-43b Davi Peixoto de Melo n.a. 
1943-45b Acioly Roriz da Luz large rancher 
1945-47b Ten. Otacflio de Sousa military police 
Ferraz 
1947b Acioly Roriz da Luz large rancher 
1947b Ten. Otacflio de Sousa military police 
Ferraz 
1947-51 Dr. Alfpio Lustosa de school director 
Carvalho 
1951-55 Elfsio Lustosa de rural product buyer 
Carvalho 
1955-59 Dr. Ariovaldo Lustosa 
de Carvalho 
1959-63 Eneas Cantarelli de merchant 
Carvalho Caribe 
1963-69 Anibal Lustosa civil servant 
Sobrinho 
1969-73 Gerson Alves de federal civil servant 
Carvalho Pires 
1973-77 Jose de Si Roriz large farmer 
1977-83 Dr. Geraldo Lustosa de doctor, medium farmer 
Faction 
Pires de Carvalho 
interventor 
interventor 
Roriz 
interventor 
Roriz (UDN) 
interventor 
Lustosa Pires de 
Carvalho (PSD) 
Carvalho 
Source: Field Research a Italicized profession is principal one 
Dominant Faction 
Leader Profession3 
Opposition Faction 
Leader Profession3 
Col. Jeronimo Pires de 
Carvalho Trapia 
Col. Jeronimo Pires de 
Carvalho Trapia 
Col. Jeronimo Pires de 
Carvalho Trapia 
Col. Jeronimo Pires de 
Carvalho 
Col. Jeronimo Pires de 
Carvalho 
Col. Manoel Araujo de 
Carv. Caribe 
Col. Manoel Araujo de 
Carv. Caribe 
Elfsio Lustosa de 
Carvalho 
large rancher 
large rancher 
large rancher, 
small merchant 
rural product buyer, 
medium rancher 
Acioly Roriz da Luz 
Elfsio Lustosa de 
C a r v a l h o and 
Deoclecio Lustosa de 
Carvalho Filho 
Deoclecio Lustosa de 
Carvalho Filho 
Deoclecio Lustosa de 
Carvalho Filho 
merchant, small 
sugar mill owner, 
small farmer 
large rancher 
Acioly Roriz da Luz 
b During the Vargas period, and for a few years after the fall of Vargas, 
mayors were appointed from the state level and were often outsiders, so they 
were called interventores. 

FIGURE 2. KINSHIP TIES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE POLITICAL LEADERS OF CHORROCH(5 
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